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Justice Cleckley sought to extend the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
attaching similar protections on state constitutional grounds. The opinion did this
by holding that
[u]nless barred by one of the recognized statutory, constitutional
or common law immunities, a private cause of action exists where
a municipality or local governmental unit causes injury by denying
that person rights that are protected by the Due Process Clause
embodied within Article 3, § 10 of the West Virginia
Constitution. 6
XIV. LABOR LAW
The case of Williams v. PrecisionCoil,lnc3 57 examined whether employers
could provide employees with handbooks that had disclaimers. Justice Cleckley
held that "[flor a disclaimer to be valid, it must be sufficiently clear, conspicuous,
and understandable so that employees will know that the handbook provides them
with no protection and it only is intended to benefit one side of the employment
relationship, i.e., the employer. 358
XV. TORT LAW
A.

Statute of Limitations

In Donley v. Bracken,359 the cause of action limitation for incompetents
found in W. Va. Code section 55-2-15 was construed. Donley held "[ijn order for
a permanently incompetent person to maintain a viable and timely action under W.
Va. Code, 55-2-15 (1923), the lawsuit must be brought within twenty years of the
date of the wrongful act and the injury. ' The opinion also determined that "[t]he
twenty year cap in W. Va. Code, 55-2-15 (1923), is reasonably related to the
legislative goal of preventing stale law suits and the failure to impose a similar cap
on competent persons does not adversely discriminate against the mentally
356

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

357

459 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1995).
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Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

359

452 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1994).
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Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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disabled."36'
It was said in Harrisonv. Davis62 that "[i]nconclusive assertions indicating
that third parties, rather than named defendants, misrepresented material facts do
' Harrison
not operate to toll the statute of limitations for a personal injury claim."363
also ruled that
An extension of the statutory filing period for a wrongful death
claim requires an affirmative act of fraud, misrepresentation, or
concealment of material facts by named defendants. Bare
assertions that third parties misrepresented the decedent's cause of
death, coupled with conclusory allegations that named defendants
may or may not have contributed indirectly to those
misrepresentations, do not rise to the level of affirmative actions
2 of
by the named defendants as contemplated by Syllabus Point
64
(1991).'
178
S.E.2d
413
523,
W.Va.
186
Romero,
v.
Miller
B.

Cause ofAction by Attorney General

The case of State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick,Inc. 65
recognized the right of the state attorney general to bring a consumer related civil
action:
The Attorney General clearly has the right to bring a civil action
against an assignee to collect a refund of an excess charge imposed
upon a consumer regardless of whether the assignee committed any
wrongdoing. The issue of wrongdoing only is relevant under
W.Va. Code, 46A-7-111(1) (1974), when the assignee may be
subjected to a "civil penalty." If the assignee can establish an
unintentional violation or a bona fide error on the part of the
wrongdoer by a preponderance of the evidence, a penalty may not

361

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

362

478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996).

363

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

364

Id.at Syl. Pt. 5.

365

461 S.E.2d 516 (W. Va. 1995).
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be imposed under this subsection. W.Va. Code, 46A-7-1 11(1).
C.

Libel

Justice
Cleckley addressed the law of libel in State ex rel. Suriano v.
367
Gaughan:
Under West Virginia law, a libel plaintiff's status sets the standard
for assessing the defendant's conduct. Plaintiffs who are public
officials or public figures must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendants made their defamatory statement with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not. Private figures need only show that the
defendants were
negligent in publishing the false and defamatory
368
statement.
Justice Cleckley also observed,
[t]he law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity,
regardless of the form of the communication. It overlooks minor
inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth. Minor
inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the
gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified. A statement is
not considered false unless it would have a different effect on the
mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have
produced.369
Finally, the opinion in Suriano carved out the defense for a defendant in a
libel action:
A libel plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure if the defendant
proves the following:
(1) the plaintiff voluntarily engaged in significant efforts

36

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

367

480 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1996).

368

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

369

Id. at Syl. Pt 4.
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to influence a public debate - or voluntarily assumed a position
that would propel him to the forefront of a public debate - on a
matter of public concern;
(2) the public debate or controversy and the plaintiffs
involvement in it existed prior to the publication of the allegedly
libelous statement; and
(3) the plaintiff had reasonable access to channels of
communication that would permit him to make an effective
response to the defamatory statement in question. 70
D.

Verdict Award
In Reed v. Wimmer,371 the court held,
[b]efore a verdict may be reversed on the basis of excessiveness,
the trial court must make a detailed appraisal of the evidence
bearing on damages. Because the verdict below is entitled to
considerable deference, an appellate court should decline to disturb
a trial court's award of damages on appeal as long as that award is
supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all
essential elements of the award. 72

The case of Bullman v. D & R Lumber Co 73 concerned treble damages
provided under a specific statute. Justice Cleckley explained the statute as follows:
The treble damage award available under W. Va. Code, 61-3-48a
(1983), is to provide compensatory damages to landowners for
damaged or removed timber, trees, logs, posts, fruit, nuts, growing
plants, or product of any growing plant. By allowing such increase
in recovery from the market value of the item removed, the
Legislature provided a remedy that would more adequately
compensate landowners. The overriding purpose of the treble
damage provision is to award the victim adequate compensation.

370

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

371

465 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1995).

372

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

373

464 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 1995).
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Its amerciable effect, if any, is secondary. 74
The opinion went on to hold, "W. Va. Code, 61-3-48a (1983), specifically states
that the treble damage award shall be in addition to and notwithstanding any other
penalties by law provided. Applying the clear language of the statute, a plaintiff
claim for punitive damages by seeking recovery under
does not foreclose his or her
375
W.Va. Code, 61-3-48a.
The issue of prejudgment interest was noted in Gribben v. Kirk. 76 Justice
Cleckley held that "[i]n cases3 77of 'special damages,' prejudgment interest must be
granted as a matter of right.
E.

Wrongful Death

The case of Gooch v. West VirginiaDepartmentof Public Safetys7 was a
wrongful death action in which a hospital was one of the named defendants. The
decedent was arrested for driving under the influence and transported to the
defendant hospital by a state trooper to have blood drawn. The blood was drawn and
the decedent was taken to jail. Several days later the decedent died of strep
pneumonia. In determining liability of the hospital from the visit, Justice Cleckley
held,
[t]o establish a hospital-patient relationship, unless otherwise
imposed by law, there must be a natural person who receives or
should have received health care from a licensed hospital under a
contract, expressed or implied. W.Va. Code, 55-7B-2(e) (1986).
As a matter of law, a hospital-patient relationship cannot be created
merely by virtue of an arrestee being presented to a hospital for a
drug and alcohol blood test. To avoid summary judgment, a
plaintiff must show sufficient additional evidence beyond the
presentation for a driving under the influence blood test to
demonstrate either an expressed or implied contract between the

374

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

375

Id. at Syl. Pt.2.

376

466 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1995).

377

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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465 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1995).
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parties was created.37 9
Justice Cleckley held in Farleyv. Sartin80 that "[a] tortious injury suffered
by a nonviable child en ventre sa mere who subsequently is born alive is
compensable and no less meritorious than an injury inflicted upon a viable child
who subsequently is born alive."381 Justice Cleckley further held,
[i]n light our previous interpretation of W. Va. Code, 55-7-5, and
the goals and purposes of wrongful death statutes generally, the
term 'person,' as used in W. Va. Code, 55-7-5 (1931) and the
equivalent language in its counterpart, W. Va. Code, 55-7-6
(1992), encompasses a nonviable unborn child and, thus, permits
a cause of action for the tortious death of such child." 2
F.

Joint Tortfeasors

The case of Savage v. Booth383 stated that "[t]he right to assert an act is
malum in se to avoid contribution belongs to ajoint-tortfeasor."3 84
G.

Immunity

the issue of immunity from liability in
Justice Cleckley addressed
385
Huntington:
of
Hutchison v. City
The ultimate determination of whether qualified or statutory
immunity bars a civil action is one of law for the court to
determine. Therefore, unless there is a bona fide dispute as to the
foundational or historical facts that underlie the immunity

379

Id at Syl. Pt. 7.

380

466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).

381

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

382

Id at Syl. Pt. 2.

383

468 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1996).
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Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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479 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1996).
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determination, the ultimate questions of statutory or qualified
immunity are ripe for summary disposition. 86
Justice Cleckley observed in Gooch v. West VirginiaDepartmentof Public
Safety 38 7 that "W. Va. Code, 17C-5-6 (1981), specifically provides civil immunity
to institutions and individuals who draw blood at the direction of a police officer
unless there is gross negligence or willful or wanton injury."388
H.

Retroactiveness of Statute

3 89 the court
In Public Citizen, Inc. v. First National Bank in Fairmont,
stated that "[a] statute that diminishes substantive rights or augments substantive
liabilities should not be applied retroactively to events completed before the
effective date of the statute (or the date of enactment if no separate effective date
39
is stated) unless the statute provides explicitly for retroactive application.""

XVI. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A.

Administrative andJudicialLitigation of Same Issue

The question of litigating a matter before an administrative tribunal and
attempting to litigate the same issue in circuit court was addressed in Vest v. Board
of Educationof County of Nicholas:39'
For issue or claim preclusion to attach to quasi-judicial
determinations of administrative agencies, at least where there is
no statutory authority directing otherwise, the prior decision must
be rendered pursuant to the agency's adjudicatory authority and the
procedures employed by the agency must be substantially similar
to those used in a court. In addition, the identicality of the issues

386

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

387

465 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1995).

388

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.

389

480 S.E.2d 538 (W. Va. 1996).
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Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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455 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1995).
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